Saturday, 26 November 2011

USA: State legislatures strengthen dealer protection

Automotive News reported last month (here) that states in the USA are strengthening laws to protect dealers. The story focuses on the cost to a Mercedes-Benz dealer of complying with the manufacturer's specification for the premises from which the dealership runs - and the dealer principal's fear that not making the huge investment will mean that he will miss out on bonuses.

How can the law protect dealers? Well, for example in Virginia the law restricts the manufacturer from requiring dealers to remodel until ten years has elapsed since the last remodelling. There are probably some fine points of definition involved in that, but the principal seems good. Moreover, dealers have the right to source the materials for the remodelling from local businesses - they aren't obliged to go to the suppliers the manufacturer nominates. Other states have similar laws: in Colorado, a dealer who's spent $250,000 doing what the manufacturer wanted can't be required to remodel for seven years.

The state of the economy doesn't seem to be stopping manufacturers from insisting on substantial investments from dealers - in the States, or in Europe. Which makes it all the stranger that state legislatures on the other side of the Atlantic are tightening their laws while over here legal protection is being removed.

Manufacturers' rights of first refusal in the USA


A dealer's ability to sell the business complete with franchise has been a controversial topic under the block exemption for years. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it doesn't only affect dealers in Europe. Start Automobile, a US Mercedes-Benz dealer, was recently prevented from selling its Mercedes dealership:  Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Star Automobile Co., et al., No. 3-11-cv-73, Order For Preliminary Injunction, (M.D. Ga. June 3, 2011).

The dealer agreement gave the manufacturer a right of first refusal, and on a preliminary application the Federal District Court accepted that the manufacturer would suffer "immediate and irreparable injury" if the injunction were not granted.

Not only did the dealer agreement to give the manufacturer a right of first refusal, but it also had a statutory right of first refusal under Georgia law. Applying principles governing the grant of an injunction in such a situation, the court said that an monetary damages would be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate. The harm the manufacturer would suffer if the injunction were denied would be likely to exceed any damage that an injunction would cause the defendant. Although there would be a delay in the transfer of the dealership, the company would continue to operate it.

The dealer challenged injunction on the grounds that it went against a state dealer statutory provision which governs the review and approval of all an ordinary business sale agreements as applied to dealers. And dealers enjoy a great deal more protection in the United States and they do in Europe, but the court explained that the rights of first refusal should be regarded as a counterweight to the approval provision. The court said this was "a less restrictive form of control a franchisor has over the identity of its business partners."

As this is only a preliminary injunction, the case might yet go to trial - though the court made clear that it considered the manufacturer was likely to succeed on its claim.

Validity of Commission's "soft law"

We're accustomed to block exemption regulations being accompanied by "explanatory brochures" and now "guidelines", and very helpful they are given the lack of detail in the actual regulations. They don't apply only to the motor vehicle block exemption (in which expression I now include the vertical restraints block exemption, as it's an integral part of the industry's exemption), but of course that's where we are particularly interested in Guidelines. And it's clear that Guidelines are intended to be much more legally significant than the old explanatory brochures.
Which makes this article by Wolfgang Weiß in the Journal of European Competition Law and Practice particularly interesting. As the abstract says, following the Treaty of Lisbon, is it lawful for the Commission to adopt "soft law" interpretations of primary and secondary legislation? Is it in effect amending the law, contrary to the democratic principles laid down in the Treaty? As the Abstract of teh article says,
Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) considerably increased the legal requirements for authorizing the Commission to adopt delegated legislation. These requirements cannot be undermined by adopting administrative standards, especially if these are of considerable legal significance.
It's a piece that will certainly bear careful reading (and, if you don't already subscribe to the Journal, you can get a day's access to the article for $50), and when I have had a chance to give it proper attention I will comment some more. 

Tuesday, 6 September 2011

No summary judgment in New York dealer dispute

... but does the manufacturer owe a fiduciary duty? Aaron Zerykier of Farrell Fritz PC reports a decision on 14 July by Justice Emerson in the Supreme Court of Suffolk County, New York. Two Audi dealers, aggrieved by the appointment of a new dealer in a bodering market area which had been assigned to them, sued Audi and one of its executive alleging, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.

The court summarily dismissed the claims for what the article calls "tortuous interference" (many American lawyers seem to have trouble with the word "tortious": the interference might well have been tortuous too, but that surely discloses no legal remedy) and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the executive. A corporate officer cannot generally be held liable for his actions on behalf of the corporation if he is acting in good faith. There are exceptions to that rule, but the evidence did not suggest that they applied in this case.

As for the claim for breach of fiduciary duty claim against the manufacturer, the court considered that this might well have some legs. There were issues of fact about the nature and extent of the manufacturer’s relationship with the plaintiff dealership which may, exceptionally, have created a fiduciary relationship. The breach of fiduciary duty claim did not merely repeat the breach of contract claim because a fiduciary duty may arise independent of the contract. The court declined to give summary judgment dismissing the claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because there was an issue of fact whether the manufacturer exercised the discretion it had in its relations with its dealers in bad faith.
A judgment of a court in the US declining to decide a case without a trial is rarely likely to be interesting. Here, however, there are several interesting points, not least the question whether a manufacturer owes its dealers a fiduciary duty. Were that the case in English law, things would be fundamentally different from the way they are - and perhaps if interested parties succeed in persuading the Commission that dealer agreements should be treated as, or like, commercial agency agreements, it might not be so very far-fetched!
Legend Autorama, Ltd. et al v. Audi of Amer., Inc. et al., Sup Ct, Suffolk County, July 14, 2011, Emerson, J, Index No. 38667/08.

Thursday, 4 August 2011

CV manufacturer not dominant in repair market

I seem to find myself reading judgments of the Bundesgerichtshof, the German federal supreme court, more often these days than those of any other court. It's doing my scant knowledge of German a lot of good, too. They have more than their fair share of cases relating to competition in the motor industry. The latest to come to my attention (a bit tardily, I'm afraid) is case no ZR 7/09 from 30 March, in which a Daimler commercial vehicle dealer and repairer sought appointment to MAN's network too. When MAN turned the application down, the dealer claimed that it was an abuse of MAN's dominant position contrary to § 20 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (law against restraints of competition). This isn't a straightforward rehash of Article 102 TFEU, as what I still think of as Article 86 is now known - but it amounts to a similar thing.

To resolve a question of abuse of a dominant position, you have to start by considering whether the undertaking concerned is in a dominant position in the market, which means taking a step back and working out what the relevant market is. The lower court had taken the view that the relevant market was the one in which customers bought services from MAN repairers - the highly brand-specific market which the Commission believes requires the strict regulation provided for under the 2010 block exemption arrangements. The BGH rejected this approach, which meant rejecting the claim.

The BGH considered that the relevant market was the market for all those products, services, and rights that enable a repairer to gain entry to the market for repair and maintenance services for commercial vehicles – the "downstream" market. The "upstream" market, as it might therefore be called, includes spare parts, diagnostic tools, repair tools, and training in brand-specific know-how as well as admission to the network.

This market is not brand-specific, according to the judgment. It is not limited to goods, services, or rights supplied by MAN, and accordingly the vehicle manufacturer did not hold a dominant position in it. Admission to the MAN was not a prerequisite for a repair shop to be active in the downstream market for repair and maintenance services. A non-authorised repair shop might not be able to do warranty work, perform services on a goodwill basis (at least, not on the basis of the manufacturer's goodwill), or participate in recall campaigns, but could still offer plenty of other. The existence of such independent repair shops did not escape the notice of the Court, and illustrated that providing these services was economically attractive. 

MAN might enjoy a big share of the downstream market for repair and maintenance services for MAN vehicles, but the Court took the view that this had no bearing on its position in the "upstream" market, the market for facilities for entry to the downstream market.

This is a rather different market analysis to that adopted by the Commission, which has tended to focus on the downstream market. Given that this is the market in which consumers are active, this is not entirely surprising, and ultimately what competition law needs to concern itself with is consumer welfare. The fact that this case involved commercial vehicles probably makes the downstream market less important, though I have to admit to not having worked through the judgment to see whether this is in fact relevant. It's certainly an interesting statement about manufacturer dominance in the repair market, and one with a surprising outcome which might prove influential in the future.

Refusal to appoint repairer not abuse of dominant position

I seem to find myself reading judgments of the Bundesgerichtshof, the German federal supreme court, more often these days than those of any other court. It's doing my scant knowledge of German a lot of good, too. They have more than their fair share of cases relating to competition in the motor industry. The latest to come to my attention (a bit tardily, I'm afraid) is case no ZR 7/09 from 30 March, in which a Daimler commercial vehicle dealer and repairer sought appointment to MAN's network too. When MAN turned the application down, the dealer claimed that it was an abuse of MAN's dominant position contrary to § 20 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (law against restraints of competition). This isn't a straightforward rehash of Article 102 TFEU, as what I still think of as Article 86 is now known - but it amounts to a similar thing.

To resolve a question of abuse of a dominant position, you have to start by considering whether the undertaking concerned is in a dominant position in the market, which means taking a step back and working out what the relevant market is. The lower court had taken the view that the relevant market was the one in which customers bought services from MAN repairers - the highly brand-specific market which the Commission believes requires the strict regulation provided for under the 2010 block exemption arrangements. The BGH rejected this approach, which meant rejecting the claim.

The BGH considered that the relevant market was the market for all those products, services, and rights that enable a repairer to gain entry to the market for repair and maintenance services for commercial vehicles – the "downstream" market. The "upstream" market, as it might therefore be called, includes spare parts, diagnostic tools, repair tools, and training in brand-specific know-how as well as admission to the network.

This market is not brand-specific, according to the judgment. It is not limited to goods, services, or rights supplied by MAN, and accordingly the vehicle manufacturer did not hold a dominant position in it. Admission to the MAN was not a prerequisite for a repair shop to be active in the downstream market for repair and maintenance services. A non-authorised repair shop might not be able to do warranty work, perform services on a goodwill basis (at least, not on the basis of the manufacturer's goodwill), or participate in recall campaigns, but could still offer plenty of other. The existence of such independent repair shops did not escape the notice of the Court, and illustrated that providing these services was economically attractive. 

MAN might enjoy a big share of the downstream market for repair and maintenance services for MAN vehicles, but the Court took the view that this had no bearing on its position in the "upstream" market, the market for facilities for entry to the downstream market.

This is a rather different market analysis to that adopted by the Commission, which has tended to focus on the downstream market. Given that this is the market in which consumers are active, this is not entirely surprising, and ultimately what competition law needs to concern itself with is consumer welfare. The fact that this case involved commercial vehicles probably makes the downstream market less important, though I have to admit to not having worked through the judgment to see whether this is in fact relevant. It's certainly an interesting statement about manufacturer dominance in the repair market, and one with a surprising outcome which might prove influential in the future.

Wednesday, 27 July 2011

Car price differentials in 2010

The European Commission has published its latest car price report (press release here). The data are six months old, relating to the start of this year.

It seems a long time since this information was anxiously awaited, when car price differences and the (misguided, in my view) attempt to prevent them drove the whole policy underlying the block exemption. Now of course the Commission is able to say that the market for new vehicles is competitive and doesn't need the close attention of which a sectoral block exemption was symptomatic. Curiously, though, we still have special rules and extensive quasi-legal guidelines which rather indicate that the motor sector remains a special case - just special in a different way, I guess. The Commission is certainly not as excited about the price differentials as it used to be, although in a true single market perhaps it should zealously stamp out any differentials ... And some of them still look pretty big to me.

One major explanation for the ending of price differentials has been the advent of the Euro, and the Commission's report distinguishes the situation in the Eurozone from that in the non-Eurozone countries. What if the Euro fails to survive its present difficulties? Perhaps it will be back to the good old days of parallel imports - and sectoral block exemptions.

Widely differing tax treatment of car purchases also made a large contribution to the problem of price differentials, and that remains: VAT rates are far from harmonised. But even more importantly, spending power is more uneven than ever - during the last few years, in which price differentials have closed, the EU has expanded considerably, bringing in eastern European countries where spending power must be a great deal less than in some other Member States. The price might be the same in Germany and Bulgaria