Showing posts with label Block exemption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Block exemption. Show all posts

Monday, 26 May 2014

Commission rejects Federauto's complaint against VW

The European Commission has rejected a complain lodged by the Italian dealer organisation, Federauto, concerning SEAT dealer agreements. The complaint alleged that competition rules had been broken because teh manufacturer (Volkswagen Group Italia) had unilaterally reduced the dealers' margin from 15.85 per cent to 12.85 per cent, and had converted part of the margin from fixed to variable. The case is number AT.40050: it is not easy to find on the Commission website (a Google search found it for me) and anyway it is 10 pages of Italian, which might be more useful to you than it is to me. It is however helpfully reported by our good friends at Van Bael and Bellis: here is a link to the article on the Mondaq service, for which you might have to register. It is also in that firm's competition law newsletter, the relevant edition of which you can download from here.
Federauto argued that this violated the rationale underlying Art 3 of Regulation 1400 as well as being contrary to the vertical restraints block exemption regulation (Regulation 330/2010). Not a great start to be basing your case on the law's rationale rather than its clear words, and always a bad idea to rely on positive obligations created by a block exemption, because generally there aren't any. If you read the argument as being that because of the failure to comply with the conditions for exemption set out in the Regulation(s) the agreement was in breach of Article 101 of the Treaty, that sounds a bit better: but it still doesn't get you to where you want to be, because you then have to convince the Commission that there is a breach Article 101 somewhere.
The Commission was not convinced. There was no evidence of a restriction of competition, such as would breach Article 101(1). The clauses in the dealership contracts concerning margins were not hardcore restrictions. The new margins did not amount to retail price maintenance because dealers remained free to fund their own discounts on sales to consumers.
The complaint also touched on another, very sensitive, area: Federauto complained that VWGI did not have a code of conduct regulating relationships with dealers. The Commission's Supplemental Guidelines on Vertical Restraints in Agreements for the Sale and Repair of Motor Vehicles tells us, of course, that the existence of such a code is a relevant factor in assessing a supplier's conduct in individual cases concerning pressure on dealers to achieve anti-competitive outcomes. However, there was no evidence that such pressure had been exerted and the Commission stated that mere failure to have a code did not amount to a breach. Nothing very surprising there.
The complaint could be seen as a last-ditch attempt to restore dealer protection principles to the block exemption regime, following their removal in the latest iteration of the Regulation. If that is what it was, the best that can be said is "nice try". Dealer protection is never going to be restored by asking the Commission to read something into the Regulation that clearly isn't there: it is going to come from the Commission imposing a code of conduct on the manufacturers, or adopting legislation like the commercial agents' directive.

Saturday, 2 February 2013

Auto 24 case: final decision from French court

The Auto 24 case, which I wrote about here, came back to the French courts from its short trip to Luxembourg and on 15 January 2013 the Cour de Cassation ruled that Jaguar Land Rover France was entitled to limit the number of dealers appointed to its selective distribution network in France.

The Cour de Cassation followed the Court of Justice's ruling, rejecting Auto 24's argument that JLR's limit on the number of its distributors restricted competition. The court stated that no legislation or regulation, national or EU, requires a manufacturer to justify its decision to draw up a numerus clausus as a criterion for quantitative selection. The clause in suit expressly limited the netwok to 72 dealership contracts for 109 sites, so it constituted a specified criterion whose content could be verified - which is what the Court of Justice said was needed. The supplier's freedom to define the scope and composition of its network therefore seems to be safe.

More details from Van Bael and Bellis via Mondaq (for which you might need a free subscription) here. This piece cross-posted from the Motor Law blog.

Wednesday, 12 December 2012

US: Tesla licensed in Massachusets

Tesla wins license to sell cars near Boston, says Automotive World. Not a matter of direct concern to us in Europe, but another illustration of the way dealers are protected in the United States. Tesla's approach to selling cars, which has been compared to Apple's retail operation, cuts right across dealer protection and licensing legislation, and is proving highly contentious (though I can't help feeling that the dealers are trying to stop an incoming tide). Hard to imagine having to obtain a licence to sell cars - hard also for Americans to imagine a manufacturer getting such a licence, as they are supposed to be there to protect dealers ...

Tuesday, 6 November 2012

Netherlands: Court rules on refusal to appoint repairers

Although it happened in July (on the 25th to be precise , reports of the decision of the Court of First Instance in Amsterdam have been slow to reach me. Brussels law firm Van Bael and Bellis, who have fingers in every interesting EU competition law case affecting the motor industry, and probably every other industry too, publicised it in their imaginatively-titled newsletter VBB on Competition Law in September, so it will be covered in the next Motor Law newsletter - but meanwhile you can follow the link to the horse's mouth.

The story is that three former authorised repairers brought an action against Kia Motors Nederland BV, which took over from the bankrupt former importer, claiming that it had unlawfully refused to reappoint them as repairers. The President of the Court ordered their temporary reappointment on 3 December 2009, and the case came before the Court on the merits this year.

In Case T-19/92, Groupement d'Achat Édouard Leclerc v Commission [1996] ECR II-1851, [1997] 4 CMLR 995 and Case T-88/92 Groupement d'Achat Édouard Leclerc v Commission  [1996] ECR II-1961, [1997] 4 CMLR 995 the Court of First Instance (now the General Court), referring to earlier cases, held that a selective distribution system is compatible with Article 85 (now Article 101 TFEU) if:
  1. The characteristics of the product in question necessitate a selective distribution system, in the sense that such a system constitutes a legitimate requirement having regard to the nature of the product concerned, in particular its high quality or technical sophistication, in order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use;
  2. Resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature which are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion;
  3. The system in question seeks to achieve a result which enhances competition and thus counterbalances the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution systems, in particular as regards price; and
  4. The criteria laid down do not go beyond what is necessary.
Both parties, oddly, agreed that Kia Motors' system did not meet these criteria - Kia conceding that they did not admit to the system all repairers who met the qualitative criteria - but they differed about the consequences. The excluded repairers argued that the system was automatically illegal, whereas the manufacturer contended that it was still necessary to consider the compatibility of the system with the competition rules before coming to a conclusion. The Court agreed with Kia that just because it did not apply the criteria in a non-discriminatory fashion did not mean that it automatically infringed the competition rules.

The next question for the court was whether Kia had refused to appoint applicants who were not also dealers as authorised repairers. This was not a hard-core restriction under the relevant version of the block exemption, but if it had happened the system would be likely to be in breach of the rules. However, the facts showed that Kia did not restrict admission to the repairer network to applicants that were also dealers, so the question of whether there was a breach did not arise.

The would-be authorised repairers also tried to argue that Kia's warranties breached competition rules, because they required vehicles to be serviced by authorised repairers: but the court found no evidence to show that a warranty would in fact be invalidated if the vehicle were serviced by an independent.

There was also an argument that Kia were abusing their dominant position in the repair market, and the court agreed that Kia were in such a position. However, they were free to choose with whom to contract. It was inherent in the system that authorised and unauthorised repairers would be treated differently, and the court was satisfied that the unauthorised ones were quite capable of competing.

Thursday, 14 June 2012

Court of Justice rules on selection criteria


The Court of Justice handed down judgment today in Case C-158/11, Auto 24 SARL v Jaguar Land Rover France SAS, a reference from the Cour de cassation. It's an important decision on the application of Regulation 1400/2002 which will remain relevant after the new rules come into force this time next year. While I read and digest the judgment, here's an extract from the press release to be going on with:
The present case concerns the quantitative selective distribution system established by Jaguar Land Rover France (JLR), which refused to appoint the French company Auto 24 as an authorised distributor of new Land Rover  motor vehicles in Périgueux (France).  JLR’s distribution system provided for the possibility of concluding 72 dealership agreements for 109 sites, set out in a table in which the town of Périgueux does not feature. 
Auto 24 brought an appeal before the Cour de cassation (France) seeking, in essence, compensation for the loss resulting from the refusal to appoint it as an authorised JLR distributor in Périgueux. That court asks the Court of Justice to interpret the term ‘specified criteria’ [found in Article 1(1)(f) of the block exemption]. In essence, the question is whether, in order to benefit from that regulation, a quantitative selective distribution system must be based on criteria which are objectively justified and applied in a uniform manner in respect of all applicants for authorisation. 
... [T]he Court explains that it refers to criteria whose precise content may  be verified. It states that  it is not necessary that the selection criteria used be published, at the risk  of compromising business secrets, or even facilitating possible collusive behaviour.  
The Court  points out that  the exemption regulation lays down distinct conditions for application according to  whether the system in question is classified as ‘quantitative selective distribution’ or ‘qualitative selective distribution’. Therefore, if, in the context of the regulation, the quantitative selection criteria had to be objective and non-discriminatory, that would result in a conflation of the conditions required by the regulation for the application of the exemption regulation to qualitative selective  distribution  systems and those required for the application of the exemption to quantitative selective distribution systems. 
Consequently, the Court's answer is that, in order to benefit from the exemption regulation, a quantitative selective distribution system must be based, inter alia, on criteria whose precise content may be verified, but it is not necessary for such a system to be based on criteria which are objectively justified and applied in a uniform and non-differentiated manner in respect of all applicants for authorisation. 
The emphasis is in the original. Cross-posted from the Motor Law blog.

Saturday, 14 April 2012

Should the block exemption be less generous to independent spares?

An article from law firm Reed Smith here argues that the way the block exemption deals with independent spares is out of step with the realities of a market in which people hold on to their cars for longer. In particular, because the Commission starts from the (rebuttable) assumption that authorised networks will have more than 30 per cent of the market, because the markets for spares and repairs are brand-specific, the block exemption will never apply. The article calls this "favouritism" towards the independent sector, and argues that manufacturers and their networks need to be able to recoup from the aftermarket what they don't make on the primary market when they sell vehicles.

Twas ever thus, wasn't it? I remember a few years ago hearing Prof Garel Rhys explaining how cross-subsidisation between markets was never a good idea: vehicle sales, parts sales and maintenance and repair have to stand on their own feet, and that is what the Commission is trying, with the blunt instruments at their disposal, to achieve.