Friday, 9 August 2013

Greece: Fiat dealers asked to waive rights

The transition from one block exemption to the next has always been troublesome, although we seem to have got past the technique of terminating the entire network and offering reappointment to some or all of them. However, this time round Fiat Group Automobiles Hellas S.A. (FGAH) seem to have excelled themselves. Determined, it seems, to enter fully into the spirit of the new regulation, which of course contains nothing in the way of dealer protection, they are requiring their dealers to waive any accrued rights that they might have under the old Regulation.

They have sent out a letter of intent, in English as well as in Greek, which requires dealers to waive their rights against FGAH in relation to their existing agreements and the termination of those agreements. On 31 January next year, dealers will be required to declare that they have no claims against Fiat arising from the existing agreements and their termination, and irrevocably to waive any claims they do have.

Greek FIAT dealers are not amused. They consider the importer's and the manufacturer's actions unacceptable. The Greek car market, in common with much of the Greek economy, is in crisis, and dealers fear that FGAH is intending sometime probably next year (hence the date mentioned in the letter) to transfer the import contract to a third party. Waiving claims to protection from termination with that in prospect is not an attractive proposition for the dealers (though for the importer, in anticipation of handing over the franchise, it makes commercial sense to clear the decks).

Moreover, under Greek law I am told that a dealer may very possibly have a claim for a goodwill indemnity on termination based on the commercial agents directive (Directive 86/653 EC) and the Greek law which implements it, Presidential Decree 219/91. Recent Greek Supreme Court judgments (139/2006 and more recently 15/2013 and 16/2013, although I am not convinced that the first of those links is to the right case) indicate that dealers are more likely than not entitled to a goodwill indemnity. The Fiat letter seems to be designed to ensure no such claims will be possible, notwithstanding that Article 19 of the Directive specifies that the parties may not derogate from the indemnity and compensation provisions (Articles 17 and 18) before the contract is terminated. It would also rule out claims for sunk costs.

The commercial agents directive has been mooted by CECRA and the European Distribution Lawyers as an alternative source of protection for dealers, given the removal of their protection in the latest block exemption. But it could never serve such a purpose directly, for the simple reason that dealers are not and never have been commercial agents. At best, the directive could provide a model to be used to create a European equivalent, perhaps, of the dealers day in court acts found throughout the United States. What the Greek Presidential Decree says I do not know, but if it extends commercial-agents-style protection to dealers, it goes beyond what the directive requires, and I cannot see that a EU point involving Article 19 can arise - which is not to say that the Decree itself contains no such provision, just that if it does it's a home-grown Greek thing.

Fiat's action makes the conclusion of the new contract conditional upon the acceptance of unrelated terms and obligations, and takes undue advantage of the situation in which dealers who have significant sunk investments find themselves, especially in a crisis market with no alternatives. Lawyers acting for dealers contend that this approach is illegal under Greek law, so we might find ourselves watching this for quite long time.


Thursday, 1 August 2013

Beware the Taj Mahal dealership revovation

Although it is about Canada, this article by John Sotos of the eponymous Toronto law firm will resonate with dealers all over the world who have been asked (or told) to renovate their premises.  You can find it on Mondaq  or read it on the firm's own website.
There is little point in my repeating what it says in my own words, but I will always be indebted to Mr Sotos for alerting me to the phrase "Taj Mahal dealership renovation". We have talked here about gin palaces but the allusion to the Taj Mahal is much classier - and better hyperbole.

Thursday, 11 July 2013

Antitrust: Commission consults on review of safe harbour for minor agreements ("De Minimis" Notice)

The Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance has always been a key document in EU competition law (and EC competition law before it). It defines what agreements (and other arrangements) are too small to be worth bothering with, because they can safely be assumed not to affect competition, or at least not appreciably. Specialised car manufacturers can rely on the Notice to save them from having to comply with the block exemption. Now the Commission is consulting on a new Notice: here's what its press release says.
The European Commission invites comments on a proposal to revise its guidance notice for assessing when minor agreements between companies are not caught by the general prohibition of anticompetitive agreements under EU competition law. The proposal aims at updating the present Notice, in particular taking into account recent developments in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ*). Comments can be submitted until 3 October 2013. In light of these comments, the Commission will then adopt a new notice in
2014.
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements that are aimed at or result in appreciable restrictions of competition. The current De Minimis Notice (adopted in 2001) defines, with the help of market share thresholds, what the Commission considers not to be an appreciable restriction of competition (see IP/02/13 ). It creates a safe harbour for companies whose market shares do not exceed 10% for agreements between competitors or 15% for agreements between non-competitors. If an agreement contains a hardcore restriction, that is, a very serious restriction for which there is a presumption of anti-competitiveness, the companies cannot benefit from the safe harbour.
The Commission's proposal is aimed at ensuring consistency with other recently amended competition rules, in particular the 2010 Vertical and Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations (see IP/10/445, MEMO/10/138, IP/10/1702, MEMO/10/676) and with an ECJ ruling of December 2012 (case C-226/11 Expedia). 
Questions from a French court in the Expedia case raised the issue of whether agreements aimed at restricting competition (restrictions having an anti-competitive "object") can be considered as "de minimis" and therefore fall outside the scope of Article 101(1). The Expedia judgment has established that a restriction with an anticompetitive object constitutes, by its very nature, an appreciable restriction of competition. The proposal therefore clarifies that agreements containing a restriction by object are always seen as an appreciable restriction of competition.

The consultation documents are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_de_minimis_notice/index_en.html

* It annoys me when lawyers lazily give the Court of Justice the adjective "European". It annoys me a great deal more when another European Union institution does so. The Court is properly called the Court of Justice of the European Union, but that title refers to the institution which consists of two courts, the General Court (which we used to call the Court of First Instance, which made it a bit easier to understand what it was for) and the Court of Justice - just that, which is utterly confusing but must be respected as best we can. Valentine Korah always used to call the Court of Justice "the Community Court", so I wonder whether she'd now call it the "Union Court"? I shall try to find out.

Thursday, 28 February 2013

Dealers cannot be prevented from selling online

My friends at Dreyfus & associés in Paris have blogged about an important decision of the Autorité de la concurrence in a matter involving Bang & Olufsen and their selective distribution network. B&O tried to stop dealers selling online, and were (not very surprisingly) hit with a penalty of €900,000. The blog posting is here: http://blog.dreyfus.fr/2013/02/online-selling-inseparable-from-selective-distribution-bang-olufsen-heavily-penalized/. Do read it! Alternatively, you might prefer http://blog.dreyfus.fr/2013/02/la-vente-en-ligne-indissociable-de-la-distribution-selective-lourde-sanction-pour-bang-olufsen/.

Saturday, 2 February 2013

Auto 24 case: final decision from French court

The Auto 24 case, which I wrote about here, came back to the French courts from its short trip to Luxembourg and on 15 January 2013 the Cour de Cassation ruled that Jaguar Land Rover France was entitled to limit the number of dealers appointed to its selective distribution network in France.

The Cour de Cassation followed the Court of Justice's ruling, rejecting Auto 24's argument that JLR's limit on the number of its distributors restricted competition. The court stated that no legislation or regulation, national or EU, requires a manufacturer to justify its decision to draw up a numerus clausus as a criterion for quantitative selection. The clause in suit expressly limited the netwok to 72 dealership contracts for 109 sites, so it constituted a specified criterion whose content could be verified - which is what the Court of Justice said was needed. The supplier's freedom to define the scope and composition of its network therefore seems to be safe.

More details from Van Bael and Bellis via Mondaq (for which you might need a free subscription) here. This piece cross-posted from the Motor Law blog.

Wednesday, 12 December 2012

US: Tesla licensed in Massachusets

Tesla wins license to sell cars near Boston, says Automotive World. Not a matter of direct concern to us in Europe, but another illustration of the way dealers are protected in the United States. Tesla's approach to selling cars, which has been compared to Apple's retail operation, cuts right across dealer protection and licensing legislation, and is proving highly contentious (though I can't help feeling that the dealers are trying to stop an incoming tide). Hard to imagine having to obtain a licence to sell cars - hard also for Americans to imagine a manufacturer getting such a licence, as they are supposed to be there to protect dealers ...

Tuesday, 6 November 2012

Netherlands: Court rules on refusal to appoint repairers

Although it happened in July (on the 25th to be precise , reports of the decision of the Court of First Instance in Amsterdam have been slow to reach me. Brussels law firm Van Bael and Bellis, who have fingers in every interesting EU competition law case affecting the motor industry, and probably every other industry too, publicised it in their imaginatively-titled newsletter VBB on Competition Law in September, so it will be covered in the next Motor Law newsletter - but meanwhile you can follow the link to the horse's mouth.

The story is that three former authorised repairers brought an action against Kia Motors Nederland BV, which took over from the bankrupt former importer, claiming that it had unlawfully refused to reappoint them as repairers. The President of the Court ordered their temporary reappointment on 3 December 2009, and the case came before the Court on the merits this year.

In Case T-19/92, Groupement d'Achat Édouard Leclerc v Commission [1996] ECR II-1851, [1997] 4 CMLR 995 and Case T-88/92 Groupement d'Achat Édouard Leclerc v Commission  [1996] ECR II-1961, [1997] 4 CMLR 995 the Court of First Instance (now the General Court), referring to earlier cases, held that a selective distribution system is compatible with Article 85 (now Article 101 TFEU) if:
  1. The characteristics of the product in question necessitate a selective distribution system, in the sense that such a system constitutes a legitimate requirement having regard to the nature of the product concerned, in particular its high quality or technical sophistication, in order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use;
  2. Resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature which are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion;
  3. The system in question seeks to achieve a result which enhances competition and thus counterbalances the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution systems, in particular as regards price; and
  4. The criteria laid down do not go beyond what is necessary.
Both parties, oddly, agreed that Kia Motors' system did not meet these criteria - Kia conceding that they did not admit to the system all repairers who met the qualitative criteria - but they differed about the consequences. The excluded repairers argued that the system was automatically illegal, whereas the manufacturer contended that it was still necessary to consider the compatibility of the system with the competition rules before coming to a conclusion. The Court agreed with Kia that just because it did not apply the criteria in a non-discriminatory fashion did not mean that it automatically infringed the competition rules.

The next question for the court was whether Kia had refused to appoint applicants who were not also dealers as authorised repairers. This was not a hard-core restriction under the relevant version of the block exemption, but if it had happened the system would be likely to be in breach of the rules. However, the facts showed that Kia did not restrict admission to the repairer network to applicants that were also dealers, so the question of whether there was a breach did not arise.

The would-be authorised repairers also tried to argue that Kia's warranties breached competition rules, because they required vehicles to be serviced by authorised repairers: but the court found no evidence to show that a warranty would in fact be invalidated if the vehicle were serviced by an independent.

There was also an argument that Kia were abusing their dominant position in the repair market, and the court agreed that Kia were in such a position. However, they were free to choose with whom to contract. It was inherent in the system that authorised and unauthorised repairers would be treated differently, and the court was satisfied that the unauthorised ones were quite capable of competing.